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ransparency has become a core principle of 
good governance (Hood & Heald, 2006; 
Fenster, 2015) and is expected to generate positive 
outcomes, such as greater accountability, increased 
trust, and less corruption (Grimmelikhuijsen & 
Meijer, 2014). One important potential mechanism 
to ensure governments become more transparent is 
Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation, and 
there are now an estimated one hundred such laws 
or regulations in force across the world (freedom-
info.org, 2018). But how effective is FOI in estab-
lishing greater responsiveness and, eventually, 
transparency? How much better are such laws than 
more informal, non-legal routes? 
FOI laws themselves are increasingly being 
used as a device for experimental research to test 
for their potential impact on compliance or ‘con-
cordance’ with the ‘spirit’ of the law (Grimme-
likhuijsen & Meijer, 2014: Richter & Wilson, 2013, 
p. 181). First, various experiments have been used 
to probe how the identity of the sender of a FOI 
request affects whether and how governments re-
spond (Lagunes, 2006; Michener & Rodriguez, 
2015). For instance, Lagunes & Pocasangre (2017) 
used Mexico’s FOI Act to see if implied connec-
tions to certain influential families had an effect on 
responses but found little evidence of partiality. In 
contrast, Grohs & Knill (2017) used a series of re-
quests to assess gender and ethnic bias in German 
local government, finding evidence of gender dis-
crimination for Turkish women, but not in general. 
Secondly, FOI experiments have investi-
gated whether the content of the request influences 
responsiveness (e.g. Cuillier, 2010; Ben-Aaron et 
al., 2017; Spac, Vodab & Zagrapanc, 2018). In the 
US, Cuillier (2010) experimented with the tone of 
requests and found that a more adversarial tone led 
to more responsiveness. In a Slovakian FOI exper-
iment, Spac, Vodab & Zagrapanc (2018) found that 
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a ‘moral appeal’ had no effect but framing a request 
as an ‘official’ FOI request did improve the chances 
of a response. 
Overall, these studies have given us insight 
into how and whether laws function in terms of re-
sponsiveness and potential bias at the micro-level. 
They have also illustrated some of the limitations, 
as most of the experiments were not compared 
with other routes of access, and they have focused 
only on whether there was a reaction and less on 
the quality or effect of the information on a broader 
public. In a recent field experiment with local gov-
ernment in England (U.K.), Worthy, John & Van-
noni (2017) found that indeed FOI requests are 
more effective than asks in terms of the quantity 
and quality of responses. Their experiment was 
conducted on a sample of 4,300 parish councils, the 
lowest local level in England, which were requested 
to provide the organizational chart of the parish 
council. Furthermore, authorities were asked to go 
beyond what is legally required and publish the in-
formation publicly, allowing the researchers to as-
sess whether FOI leads to greater pro-active open-
ness (transparency). Overall, the Worthy et al. 
(2017) field experiment is the first to show that FOI 
requests—as opposed to informal asks for infor-
mation—not only increase responsiveness to the 
individual requester but engender transparency for 
the broader public. 
In this article, we present the results of a 
close replication of the original field experiment by 
Worthy et al. (2017) in the Netherlands. Empirical 
replications are important to build confidence in 
existing theories and to identify boundary condi-
tions of causal effects. The attention to replication 
studies in public administration and management 
research is still very limited, although there has 
been a recent symposium on replication (Walker, 
James & Brewer, 2017) and a framework to evalu-
ate such research (Pedersen & Stritch, 2018).  
A more specific reason for replication is 
that the Worthy et al. (2017) experiment was only 
conducted in the UK (specifically England) and we 
investigate whether these findings extend to a dif-
ferent political and administrative context (the 
Netherlands). We use the term “close replication” 
as an “exact replication” is impossible to achieve 
(Brandt et al., 2014). This means that we stay as 
close to the original experimental treatment and 
procedure as possible. We will use this close repli-
cation to assess the external validity and boundary 
conditions of Worthy et al.’s findings by investigat-
ing FOI in a different context (Jilke et al., 2016).  
The Netherlands is a good case to assess 
the external validity of the original findings, as it 
shares some key characteristics with the UK but at 
the same time differs in some important respects. 
First, the Netherlands has a much longer formal 
tradition with FOI legislation (1980 in the Nether-
lands compared to 2005 in the UK) and second, the 
Netherlands has a less adversarial media or political 
culture willing to turn FOI into a political weapon 
(Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Grimmelikhuijsen & 
Kasymova, 2015). Third, the replication inevitably 
focuses on a different type of local government: the 
municipal instead of parish level. The Netherlands 
does not have the latter’s lower, primarily village or 
town level of government. Municipalities operate 
on a larger scale than parish councils and are there-
fore expected to be accustomed to larger volumes 
of FOI requests (with, for example, a larger profes-
sional staff trained to deal with them and set pro-
cedures). The goal of this replication study, there-
fore, is to see if the results of the original experi-
ment still hold in spite of these differences in insti-
tutional and administrative context. Thus, the cen-
tral research question is: 
 
To what extent can Freedom of Information requests improve 
transparency of local governments in the Netherlands? 
 
Freedom of Information and  
Transparency 
 
Freedom of Information (FOI) laws are the legal 
backbone for creating and safeguarding a basic 
level transparency. A FOI-type law as has been 
adopted by most countries across the globe (Relly 
& Sabharwal, 2009).  
We define ‘transparency’ as ‘the availability 
of information about an organization or actor al-
lowing external actors to monitor the internal 
workings or performance of that organization’ 
(Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer 2014, p. 139). This 
definition is generally in line with how transparency 
is defined in the literature. A systematic literature 
review on 187 studies on transparency by Cuccini-
ello, Porumbescu & Grimmelikhuijsen (2017) re-
veals that most definitions address some core com-
ponents, such the availability of information to 
‘outsiders’, who use openness mechanisms to gain 
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an insight into decision-making processes, opera-
tions, budgets or performance of a governmental 
body.  
Most FOI audit studies only measure 
transparency in a more general sense of responsive-
ness to an outsider. Some experiments measure 
simple compliance with the basic right to infor-
mation enshrined in a FOI law, testing the opera-
tion of the system by examining if various public 
bodies make information available to the requester 
(e.g. Spac et al., 2018; Cuillier, 2010). The FOI re-
quester is an ‘outsider’; yet measuring responsive-
ness only takes us so far. It is unclear whether a re-
sponse—without qualifying its content—truly pro-
vides an ‘insight’ into a government organization or 
if the information was already available by informal 
routes.  
Providing information directly to a single 
requester is a rather narrow view of transparency. 
Generally, transparency refers to broader public 
and pro-active access to information.  This can pro-
vide insight into how effective the chain of request 
to response is and offer a snapshot of the strength 
of openness culture within an organization. So far 
only the Worthy et al. (2017) experiment included 
both of these critical elements of transparency: 
measuring public access via the law as against a 
non-legal ask, and also measuring the quality of the 
response to see if the organization goes further 
than the law requires.  
This important difference is captured in 
the possible responses of governments to FOI re-
quests that Worthy et al. (2017) distinguish: com-
pliance (doing as the law asks to varying degrees) 
and concordance (behaving in ways that move be-
yond the law and doing more than it asks, see Rich-
ter & Wilson, 2013). Such a distinction resonates 
with an often-made distinction in the literature be-
tween ‘passive’ and ‘active’ transparency (Grimme-
likhuijsen & Meijer, 2014). Passive transparency 
aligns with legal compliance: sending information 
but doing nothing further to disclose information 
to other people who might be interested. In con-
trast, active transparency is the simultaneous pro-
active disclosure of information on websites or 
other information carriers so that anyone interested 
can access the information.  
Thus, the aim of this study is to probe if 
FOI fosters active transparency, not just respon-
siveness or passive transparency. We do this by rep-
licating the Worthy et al. experiment in the Dutch 
context. Despite some obvious contextual differ-
ences between both countries, we have no a priori 
reason to believe the outcomes will be different. 
We therefore adopt the two main hypotheses from 
the original study without modifying them.  
Hypothesis 1 is the main hypothesis and is 
supported by the findings of the UK field experi-
ment. Parish councils were more likely to respond 
if they were sent a FOI request, as compared to an 
informal request or ask. 
 
H1: Local authorities will be more responsive to a FOI re-
quest than to an informal ask. 
 
Hypothesis 2 is based on the notion that larger au-
thorities also have more capacity to process re-
quests and respond to them in time. This hypothe-
sis is in line with Grimmelikhuijsen & Welch’s 
(2012) finding that organizational capacity partly 
explains differences in the transparency of local 
governments. H2 was not supported by the find-
ings of the UK field experiment. Nevertheless, we 
decided to include this hypothesis to assess if the 
size of the local authority mattered for responsive-
ness in the Netherlands, given their larger size. 
 
H2: Local authorities with larger populations will be more 
responsive than smaller authorities.1 
 
Research Design and Method 
 
Experimental setting: 
Freedom of Information in the Netherlands 
As with the earlier UK experiment, we asked mu-
nicipalities to provide us with information (in the 
form of an organization chart). Authorities are 
obliged to give these under the Dutch FOIA (so 
meeting the requirement for passive disclo-
sure/compliance). However, we also asked them to 
publish the same information on their website ‘in 
the spirit of the Dutch FOIA’ (matching the higher 
proactive disclosure/concordance requirement).  
As with the UK law and elsewhere, the 
Dutch legislation highlights, through a statutory 
duty, that public bodies must provide the infor-
mation to whomever asks for it, and requesters do 
not have to provide arguments for why they want 
access to the information. A government organiza-
tion can deny the disclosure of information based 
on a limited set of arguments or exemptions 
summed up in the Dutch FOIA (Wet Openbaarheid 
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van Bestuur). The government organization must 
then answer the request within a period of four 
weeks. This period can be extended, but the re-
quester must be informed about this.  
Finally, according to Dutch FOIA, in prin-
ciple any information request can be processed as 
an official FOI request, including informal requests 
or asks. Consequently, we cannot exclude the pos-
sibility that some informal requests have been clas-
sified as official requests. However, that does not 
affect our general expectation, because specifically 
mentioning legal provisions is expected to be a 
stronger signal to municipalities to process the re-
quest and to respond.  
 
Design and Ethics 
Similar to the original UK experiment, we sent our 
request on behalf of an NGO called ‘De Open Ge-
meente’ [The Open Municipality], a neutral cam-
paign group seeking municipal openness, created 
through the use of an organization website. Those 
receiving the request would, we presumed, be likely 
to be somewhat sympathetic to its aims. This is im-
portant to note since different ‘types’ of requesters 
provoke varying responses (Worthy, 2013). More-
over, studies simply making requests as named ac-
ademics have suffered low response rates (Cuillier, 
2010). 
Our aim was therefore to be as transparent 
as possible while not endangering the experiment 
with low response rates. Drawing attention to the 
fact we are academics ‘doing an experiment’ would 
be more likely to lead to either non-compliance or 
behavior influenced by our position and work 
(Cuillier, 2010). So the request stated that we were 
‘part of a research project examining the impact of 
FOI on openness in local government’ (see letter in 
Appendix A). We ensured transparency by doing 
the following: 
 
 The name of the lead researcher was at the end 
of the emailed FOI/request with a link to our 
websites and previous research.  
 The names of the research team were men-
tioned on the website with links to our respec-
tive staff pages.  
 We provided contact details and also asked in 
the request for respondents to contact us 
should they wish to know more.   
 The project summary was also on the website 
as were details of the experiment after the re-
search was conducted.  
 
Therefore, the NGO approach was chosen to ob-
tain maximum responses and ensure the experi-
ment works. We made it explicit that there is a link 
between the underpinning research and an NGO-
style organization. Indeed, as researchers we also 
supported the wider objectives expressed by the or-
ganization (making municipalities more open).  
We believe this approach minimized the 
risk of non-compliance while being as transparent 
as possible. Our design was approved by the Ethics 
Board of the Faculty of Law, Economics and Gov-
ernance on August 28, 2017, internal reference 
number 17-002. 
 
Preregistration 
Preregistration is generally seen as a good way to 
increase the credibility of published results (Nosek 
& Lakens, 2014). We registered our design on Oc-
tober 13, 2017, which was after the data collection 
started (September 25, 2017), but well before data 
collection had ended and analysis had begun. The 
design was registered with the EGAP (Evidence in 
Governance and Politics) Design Registrations da-
tabase. The design ID number is 20171012AA 
(http://egap.org/registration/2883). The preregis-
tered design included a third hypothesis that could 
only be tested with a follow-up experiment. As of 
yet, we have not carried out the follow up experi-
ment and thus have not included it in this article.  
 
Sample 
We estimated that we needed a sample size 
of 318 (159 per group) at 80 percent power with an 
alpha of .05 (two-sided) based on obtaining the 
same effect size as the Worthy et al. study (an 11.1 
percentage point difference). The total size of the 
municipalities of 390 (in 2017) was thus a sufficient 
sample. We sampled all municipalities in the Neth-
erlands, which means that we had enough statistical 
power to give the original study a fair chance of be-
ing successfully replicated (Asendorpf et al., 2013). 
One request was returned to sender by the postal 
office, which meant that our final sample consisted 
of 389 municipalities.  
 
Use of Materials 
Journal of Behavioral Public Administration, 1(2) 
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Although we tried to stay as close as possible to the 
original materials and procedures, we had to make 
various adaptions to make the requests fit the 
Dutch context (see Appendix A for the letter in 
Dutch and Appendix B for the English translation). 
First, we had to use regular mail to make the re-
quests instead of e-mail because most municipali-
ties prohibit FOI requests via email. In our written 
letter we asked for an electronic response to in-
crease the similarity with the original experiment.  
The letters were kept as close as possible 
to the original materials (cf. Brandt et al., 2014). We 
made one significant change to the control letter to 
adapt it to the Dutch context. The original control 
letter in the Worthy et al. (2016) stated ‘Please note 
that this is not an FOI request’. We removed this 
phrase because according to Dutch law in principle 
any information request can be processed as an of-
ficial FOI request, so also the informal request. We 
were afraid that adding a sentence that this was not 
an FOI request would actually confuse participants 
and even prime them in the opposite direction: 
thinking of the information request as a FOI re-
quest because of the mere mention of it.  
 
Measures and Analysis 
The outcome variable was pre-registered and con-
sisted of the five ordinal categories (shown below). 
First of all, we analyzed the difference in responses 
between the two treatments and control groups 
Secondly, we also took into consideration the con-
trol variables mentioned above by carrying out an 
ordinal outcome variable regression analysis, which 
takes into account the ordered rather than interval 
nature of the response variable and also follows the 
Worthy et al approach. Note that the coding of the 
dependent variable is more sophisticated than 
merely coding for whether or not a response was 
received. Furthermore, the coding also captures the 
idea of ‘active transparency’ (code 4, concordance). 
Here are the five categories: 
 
0: No reply. Municipality does not respond or only 
an automated delivery receipt [no compliance]. 
1: Reply, but does not provide the organization 
chart or any detailed information [lesser compli-
ance].   
2: Link or background. A direct link or specific di-
rection how to find the chart only are provided, yet 
the chart is not attached to the response as re-
quested [partial compliance]. 
3: Send information. The chart is sent as an attach-
ment, yet the chart is not made public on a website 
[full compliance]. 
4: Make information public. Information was sent 
and explicitly stated the intent to publish it in the 
public domain as a result of our request [concord-
ance]. 
 
We obtained a list with the names of all municipal-
ities in the Netherlands and randomly assigned each 
municipality to either control (informal ask) or 
treatment (legal request). The website random.org 
was used to carry out the random assignment.  
The results are balanced between treat-
ment and control with no significant difference in 
the following covariates: number of residents, pres-
ence of FOI information on website, income, pres-
ence of information about previous FOI requests, 
presence of information about local council meet-
ing minutes and pre-treatment. A regression of the 
treatment allocation on these covariates shows 
none of them to be statistically significant. This re-
gression is reproduced in Appendix C, Table CA. 
 
Results 
The overall response rate of our study was high: 
76.9 percent of all municipalities responded to our 
request. When we look at the basic measure for 
FOI effectiveness, the five-point compliance scale, 
we find some clear differences between the control 
and treatment group (Table 1). 
We find that 89.2 percent of the treated 
municipalities provide a response, whereas only 
64.6 percent of the municipalities in the control 
group responded; when cross-tabulated against all 
other responses, this is a significant difference 
(χ2=32.99, p<.001). All significance tests were two-
tailed. Interestingly, there was no significant differ-
ence for lesser compliance and full compliance (for 
lesser compliance χ2= 0.40, p=.527, for full compli-
ance χ2=.011, p=.916). However, treated munici-
palities were more likely to at least partially comply 
by sending a link to a chart (χ2=4.08, p=.043) and 
to act ‘in the spirit of the law’, in other words pub-
lishing a chart on their website and sending the 
chart as an attachment (concordance). The differ-
ence in the frequencies for concordance in the con-
trol and treated groups, when compared to all other 
responses, is statistically different (χ2=16.41, p. 
<.001). Overall, we find support for the first hy-
pothesis: a FOI request leads to overall higher re-
sponse rates. In addition, there is a strong effect on 
Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2018 
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concordance as with Worthy et al.’s results, which 
are reproduced in Table 1.  
To assess whether a formal FOI request 
leads to increased transparency (concordance) we 
carried out an auxiliary analysis in which we include 
only those municipalities that were not ‘pre-
treated’, in other words, who did not have an or-
ganizational chart online at the time of the request. 
It should be noted that this analysis was not pre-
registered and thus should be considered explora-
tory. Fully 50.3 percent of the municipalities had no 
chart online prior to the experiment. Within this 
subsample, we find that only 12.3 percent of the 
municipalities in the control group published the 
chart online while 32.6 percent in the treatment 
group did so, which is a highly significant difference 
(χ2=11.82, p =.001). This result corroborates our 
hypothesis that FOI requests not only increase re-
sponsiveness, but more importantly also have the 
potential to improve transparency to the public at 
large.  
 
Figure 1 
Percentage of Responses with Confidence Intervals 
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40%
50%
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No Reply Lesser Compliance Partial Compliance Full Compliance Concordance
Control Treatment
Table 1 
UK Study Compared with Replication Study, Percentage of Responses 
 
Response UK  
Control 
 UK 
FOI 
Replication 
Control  
Replication 
FOI 
No reply  90.79     79.65 33.38 10.82 
Reply 4.63 8.36 6.67        5.15 
Link or 
background 
1.44 2.60 7.18   13.40 
Send chart 2.82 7.81 18.97 18.56 
Make public 0.32 1.58 31.79    52.06 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N 2,160 2,152 195 194 
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Regression Analysis 
To replicate Worthy et al., we carried out regression 
analysis, reported in Table 2, which also allows for 
a test of Hypothesis 2, introduces covariates, and 
controls for the effect of already being treated, 
which in this case means that the requested infor-
mation (organizational chart) was already disclosed 
on a website prior to our request. We use an or-
dered probit estimator as in the original study. We 
also produce ordinary least squares (OLS) esti-
mates, reported in Appendix D Table D1, for com-
parison, though the interpretation of these models 
is essentially the same irrespective of estimator 
used. Appendix D also contains probit regressions 
carried out on each item in the response variable 
(Tables D2-D5), which shows that only the ‘Make 
Public’ outcome, compared to all other response 
options, is significant when regressed with covari-
ates. 
Model 1 reports the impact of the treat-
ment alone, as in bivariate analysis. As expected 
from the descriptive results, there is a large main 
effect: the coefficient on the treatment represents a 
factor change in odds of 0.3149 for a unit increase 
in X (standardised at 0.3003). Model 2 adjusts for 
the covariates of size, average income of residents, 
whether there is attention to FOI on the website 
(e.g. how to do it, what it is), whether there is a re-
pository of recent requests, whether transcripts of 
council minutes are accessible online, and whether 
the council has been pre-treated (see measurement 
above). Please note that the number of cases differs 
Table 2 
Ordered Probit Estimates of the Effect of FOI 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
     
Treatment 0.629*** 0.626*** 0.542*** 0.648*** 
 (0.115) (0.120) (0.151) (0.162) 
Mean Income  -1.41e-06 -1.03e-06 -1.31e-06 
  (2.15e-05) (2.15e-05) (2.15e-05) 
Size  -4.79e-07 -3.69e-06 -4.82e-07 
  (1.09e-06) (3.71e-06) (1.09e-06) 
Request information  0.0117 0.00449 0.0150 
  (0.140) (0.140) (0.141) 
Request repository  0.00275 -0.00225 0.00393 
  (0.330) (0.332) (0.330) 
Council minutes  0.0175 0.0184 0.0174 
  (0.0462) (0.0462) (0.0462) 
Pretreated  0.592*** 0.595*** 0.668 
  (0.122) (0.122) (0.379) 
Size*Treatment   2.07e-06  
   (2.26e-06)  
Pretreated*Treatment    -0.0510 
    (0.241) 
     
/cut1 0.176 0.400 0.275 0.436 
 (0.180) (0.385) (0.408) (0.422) 
/cut2 0.372* 0.606 0.482 0.642 
 (0.181) (0.386) (0.409) (0.422) 
/cut3 0.668*** 0.911* 0.787 0.947* 
 (0.183) (0.388) (0.410) (0.424) 
/cut4 1.160*** 1.430*** 1.306** 1.466*** 
 (0.185) (0.389) (0.412) (0.426) 
Observations 389 367 367 367 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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because we had missing observations on some of 
the covariates.  
Only the pre-treatment of the municipality 
increased the probability of response and the qual-
ity of the response, while there remains a treatment 
effect overall. Model 3 tests whether an interaction 
of size and the treatment is significant which it is 
not. There is no variation in response to the treat-
ment by council size, so no support for hypothesis 
2.  Model 4 tests whether the treatment is affected 
by the pre-treatment variable, which it is not. Ap-
pendix E contains conditional marginal plots for 
these interactions that show the slopes of the mar-
gins for the interactions are as expected (e.g. Figure 
E3 for residents), but there is nothing statistically 
significant to report. 
 
Conclusion: Effect is Replicated, 
Effect Size is Not 
 
Overall, we find support for H1 (FOI increases 
transparency) and not for H2 (interaction between 
size and responsiveness), both of which are in line 
with the original UK experiment. Also, the strong-
est effect seems to be on concordance, which is also 
in line with the original experiment. To compare 
whether the effect size was replicated, we used the 
F-statistic of both studies and calculated Cohen’s 
D. The original study (F=109.51, ncontrol=2160 ntreat-
ment=2152) had an effect size of D=0.319 (CI95= 
.259-.379). This replication study has an effect size 
of D=0.586 (CI95=.383-.789). These are signifi-
cantly different effect sizes. This means that, alt-
hough the effect itself is replicated, the effect size 
is not. There are a variety of potential explanations 
for this difference in effect size.  
One contextual variation that might have 
caused this difference concerns the nature of local 
jurisdictions. Compared to the original experiment 
by Worthy et al. (2017), our experiment focused on 
a more aggregated local and probably more profes-
sionalized level of government. Municipalities in 
the Netherlands are relatively large with a median 
population of 43,524 residents, compared to a pop-
ulation average of less than 10,000 for parish coun-
cils in the UK. The high response rate and effect 
size could be because, as outlined above, the larger 
municipalities in the Netherlands may be better 
equipped to handle requests than the smaller and 
more local parish councils in the UK, which are 
mostly run by a part-time clerk. This may have 
meant that the requests were less likely to be lost, 
ignored or overlooked in the Netherlands, with 
more resources and systems in places to deal with 
them. 
A second contextual variation regards the 
institutional environment. The Netherlands has a 
less adversarial media and political culture than An-
glo-Saxon countries such as the UK. In more ad-
versarial media cultures, FOI can more easily turn 
into a political weapon that can make local author-
ities more fearful of releasing information (Grim-
melikhuijsen & Kasymova, 2015). Likewise, differ-
ent ‘transparency regimes’ might affect responsive-
ness. Ruijer & Meijer (2016) found that pre-existing 
institutional differences affect how transparency is 
approached. In the United States a ‘rule-based’ re-
gime has emerged, focusing on strict compliance 
with set procedures. In contrast, the Netherlands 
has a ‘principles-based’ transparency regime, focus-
ing less on strict compliance and more with acting 
‘in the spirit of the law’. We imagine that such in-
stitutional differences may also occur between the 
Netherlands and the UK, resulting in a more re-
sponsive approach to FOI requests in the Nether-
lands. 
 
Directions for a Systematic Replication 
Agenda on FOI Effectiveness 
 
In order to explain the difference in effect size, 
more research is needed. This highlights the 
strength but also the weakness of a single replica-
tion study in public administration. The strength is 
that the validity of findings can be confirmed by 
replicating an effect in a different political and ad-
ministrative context. The weakness is that the po-
tential contextual differences—especially in field 
experiments—are myriad and, if the outcomes of 
such a replication differ, it is impossible to tell what 
contextual differences have resulted in a different 
outcome. In the end, a more systematic replication 
agenda could solve this issue by building a coherent 
body of experimental knowledge that can be in-
cluded in meta-analyses, which can identify poten-
tial moderators. We have the following recommen-
dations for such an agenda.  
First, close replications are needed but in political 
contexts that differ more widely. Although this replica-
tion was carried out in a different context, the po-
litical cultures carry broad similarities. Both are 
Western European countries with strong cultural 
and economic ties and, to an extent, shared histo-
Journal of Behavioral Public Administration, 1(2) 
 
 
9 
 
ries. Both the Netherlands and the UK, for exam-
ple, have a long history of openness and democracy 
with, at the local level, formalized access to meet-
ings and records going back decades. Are the find-
ings valid in contexts that are more strongly diver-
gent? The Slovakian case would offer one example 
of a successful experiment in a slightly different en-
vironment (Spac et al., 2018). A suggestion for fu-
ture replications would therefore be to carry out 
this experiment in other countries that have much 
less experience with democracy, openness and 
Freedom of Information regulations. Replicating 
this experiment in, for instance, a new democracy, 
a hybrid regime or semi-authoritarian regime could 
be a ‘stress test’ for the outer bounds of the external 
validity of our findings.   
Second, we recommend carrying out conceptual rep-
lications with different types of requests. Although we now 
know that FOI helps to increase responsiveness 
and quality of responses in the UK and the Neth-
erlands for a relatively simple information request, 
we do not know if or how FOI works with more 
politically sensitive or problematic requests. One 
could think of testing requests for spending decla-
rations of politicians, ministerial diaries or certain 
types of policy analysis. Overall, one would expect 
governments to be more hesitant to release this 
kind of information, yet the effectiveness of FOI 
on disclosing this kind of information is relatively 
unknown. A further possibility is that other bodies 
could be requested: elsewhere FOI has been used 
to examine public institutions as diverse as schools 
and police departments. 
We acknowledge that experimenting with 
such kinds of requests involves risks as well: first, 
there is a higher burden for governments to collect 
and disclose such information, which raises ethical 
questions about the potential costs of the experi-
ment for ‘participants’, though this is mitigated by 
asking for information that is clearly of public and 
democratic value. Such requests will have to be 
carefully chosen and crafted as they may also be 
more likely to come up against legal exemptions.  
Overall, the direction of the effect was re-
produced in our study, which gives more confi-
dence in the external validity of the initial UK find-
ings (Brandt et al., 2014; Walker et al., 2017). We 
replicated the increase in response rate and trans-
parency (concordance), yet the magnitude of the ef-
fect of FOI requests seems to be more sensitive to 
contextual varieties. 
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Notes 
 
1. There are 390 municipalities in the Nether-
lands. All were sampled, yet one letter was re-
turned to sender by the postal office, without 
any clear reason. 
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